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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent•

Case No. 880168-CA

vs.
Priority 2

CHARLENE ANN HOLMES,
Defendant-Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION & NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal of a conviction of a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i)
and 58-37-8(7) (1986)(amended 1988).

This Court has jurisdiction

over this appeal from the district court under Utah Code Ann. §
78-2a-3(2)(s) (1987) .
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the initial stop of the car in which

Defendant was riding was a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
2.

Whether the officers had reasonable suspicion to

retrieve the roll of towels Defendant tried to hide.
3.

Whether the standard for picking up and inspecting

evidence in plain view should be reasonable suspicion.
4.

Whether the officers had reasonable suspicion to

pick up and inspect the evidence.

5.

Whether the "totality, of the circumstances" test

is the appropriate standard for determining whether reasonable
suspicion to stop and detain a person exists.
STATE PROVISION
The State relies in this brief on the following
statutory provision:
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and
question suspect—Grounds. A peace officer may stop any person
in a public place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe
he has committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting
to commit a public offense and may demand his name, address and
an explanation of his actions.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with Unlawful Possession of a
Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann § 58-77-8 (2)(a)(i)(1986)(amended 1988).
Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence which was
heard on November 20, 1987 in the Third Judicial District Court,
the Honorable James S. Sawaya presiding.
on November 24, 1987.

The motion was denied

Defendant appeared before Judge Sawaya on

January 15, 1988 and the State filed an Information amending the
charge to Attempted Unlawful Possession of a Controlled
Substance, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of §§ 58-37-8
(2)(a)(i) and 58-37-8(7) (1986) (amended 1988).

Defendant

submitted the case on the evidence heard at the suppression
hearing and Defendant was convicted of the amended charge.
On February 12, 1988, defendant was sentenced to 12
months in the Salt Lake County Jail.

The sentence was stayed &

defendant was placed on probation with certain conditions.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On September 17, 1987, at approximately 8:45 p.m.
Sergeant Shelton and Lieutenant Gray of the Salt Lake City Police
Department were driving southbound on State Street in Salt Lake
City (R. 39 at 4-5 and 8).

Sergeant Shelton had been a police

officer for fourteen years and had worked in vice enforcement for
four years.

He had also received additional training in vice

enforcement (R-39 at 4).

Lieutenant Gray had been a police

officer for twenty years and was in charge of special
investigations (R-39 at 25).

The officers were patrolling that

area because of the high rate of prostitution and crime in the
area of 800 South to 2100 South State. (R.39 at 5).
On that date, Sergeant Shelton saw defendant standing
on a sidewalk speaking to the driver of a truck which had pulled
across the sidewalk facing into a parking lot at approximately
1100 South State (R. 39 at 5).

Sergeant Shelton pulled in behind

the truck and defendant broke off contact with the truck (R-39 at
5-6).

When defendant left the truck she slowly walked south,

strolling and looking back toward traffic (R. 39 at 6, 13 and
21).
Less than a block later, defendant stopped and talked
to the driver of another car for a brief moment (R.39 at 6-7).
She left that car then continued south and crossed the street.
She stopped again about a block later and spoke to the driver of
a third car for a moment (R. 39 at 7).

At that point Sergeant

Shelton decided to follow defendant because her actions were
common for prostitutes in the area (R. 30 at 8).

He articulated

his reasons for following defendant at that point as:
-3-

1.

area of high prostitution and crime rate (R.39 at

2.

his experience in vice enforcement (R. 39 at 4).

3.

defendant's strolling along State Street at an

5)-

extremely slow pace (R.39 at 21)
4.

defendant looking back toward traffic (R.39 at 21).

5.

types of contact between defendant and vehicles

(R.39 at 21)
6.

short, brief conversations between defendant and

drivers (R.39 at 21)
7.

defendant's actions fit the normal scenario of

prostitutes on State Street (R.30 at 8).
As the officers observed defendant, she met again with
the driver of the second car and got into that vehicle (R.39 at
8).

They followed the car four blocks to 1700 South State and

then east on 1700 South.

The car pulled into one of the parking

lots at South High while the officers drove on, then made a Uturn.

As the officers returned westbound, the car immediately

drove out of the parking lot within only a few seconds of pulling
in.

By that time the officers were in front of the car westbound

on 1700 South (R.39 at 9). The car next turned into another
South High parking lot and the officers made another U-turn (R.39
at 9-10).

Again the car was in the parking lot only a few

seconds before driving out again.

There was no other activity at

South High that evening to justify the car puling into the
parking lot. (R.39 at 10).
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At this point the officers suspected that defendant and
the driver of the car had made a prostitution deal but had
realized that the officers were following them and defendant was
being taken back to where she was picked up.

The officers then

stopped the vehicle (R.39 at 10). An additional fact justifying
the stop was the evasive action taken by the driver of the car.
Sergeant Shelton approached the car and spoke with the driver
(R.39 at 11).
As Sergeant Shelton spoke with the driver, Lieutenant
Gray approached the passenger door of the car (R.39 at 29). As
Lieutenant Gray approached defendant in the passenger seat, he
saw her look back toward Sergeant Shelton and the driver, then
move her purse from her lap to the floor of the car.

She then

removed a roll of paper towels from her purse and tried to stuff
them down between the seat of the car and the console.
Lieutenant Gray opened the door and asked for the towels and
defendant said that they weren't hers (R.39 at 30). Lieutenant
Gray reached in and took the towels and unrolled them on the roof
of the car.

In the towels he found two syringes, a spoon and two

packets of mayonnaise (R.39 at 31). The syringes evidently
contained cocaine although the record is not clear on that point.
Defendant was arrested for possession of controlled
substance and said at the jail that the cocaine was not hers.
She was not charged with prostitution nor was the driver arrested
for solicitation (R.39 at 32).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should accord the trial court's decision on
the motion to suppress evidence and the court's verdict a
presumption of correctness.
The initial stop of the car containing defendant was
not capricious but based on articulable facts which justified the
minimal intrusion of approaching defendant to ask for
identification and explanation.
The actions of defendant as the officer approached her
gave him additional articulable facts to justify a detention of
defendant and the retrieving of the towels defendant was trying
to hide.

That reasonable suspicion that the towels contained

evidence allowed the officer to unroll the towels and find the
syringes containing apparent contraband.
The syringes with apparent contraband found in the
towels gave the officer probable cause to seize the towels and
the syringes and to arrest defendant.
The "totality of the circumstances" test for
determining reasonable suspicion for a stop and detention of
defendant is the appropriate standard under the Utah Constitution
as well as the United States Constitution.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING ON THE ADMISSIBILITY
OF THE EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM DEFENDANT SHOULD
BE ACCORDED A PRESUMPTION OF CORRECTNESS.
In this case the trial court took evidence at a hearing
on defendant's Motion to Suppress then denied the motion.

This

Court should accord that decision a presumption of correctness as
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it analyzes this case.

See State v. Criscola, 444 P.2d 517, 519

(Utah 1968), this Court should not overturn the trial court's
decision unless there is clear error.

See State v. Galleqos, 712

P.2d 207, 208-209 (Utah 1985).
Because of the trial court's position to hear the
evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses, this Court ought
to give deference to that court's verdict.

See State v.

Ballenberqer 652 P.2d 927 (Utah 1982).
POINT II.
THE INITIAL STOP OF THE VEHICLE WITHIN WHICH
DEFENDANT WAS A PASSENGER WAS NOT A DETENTION
OF DEFENDANT.
Defendant was a passenger in a vehicle driven by a man
whose name is not given in the record.

Respondent maintains that

the stop of that vehicle was based on articulable facts as
addressed in Point III of this Argument.

Even after the vehicle

was stopped the defendant was not detained until the officer who
approached her observed her attempt to hide the roll of towels
and asked to see the towels.

Defendant's actions gave the

officer reasonable suspicion to pick up and inspect the towels as
discussed in Point IV of this Argument.
The mere approaching of a person by a police officer
does not automatically activate a Fourth Amendment seizure.
Courts have consistently held that there are different levels of
police contact with citizens.

The Utah Supreme court in State v.

Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987), cites with approval the Fifth
Circuit Court's levels of police encounters in United States v.
Merritt, 736 F.2d 228 (4th Cir. 1984):

-7-

(1) an officer may approach a citizen at
anytime (sic) and pose questions so long as
the citizen is not detained against his will;
(2) an officer may seize a person if the
officer has an "articulable suspicion" that
the person has committed or is about to
commit a crime; however, the "detention must
be temporary and last no than is necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop"; (3) an
officer may arrest a suspect if the officer
has probable cause to believe an offense has
been committed or is being committed. 736
F.2d at 230 (citation omitted).
739 P.2d at 617-618
In the present case, the officers waved over the car
carrying defendant.
Sergeant Shelton.

The driver exited the car and spoke with
Lieutenant Gray walked up to the passenger door

and saw defendant's furtive movements as he approached defendant.
Defendant had not been detained at that point, the officer was
merely approaching her.

Her actions then gave the officer

reasonable suspicion to pick up and inspect the roll of towels
defendant had attempted to hide as is discussed later in this
brief.
The issue at this point becomes whether an officer may
approach a passenger of a lawfully stopped (See Point III) vehicle
to ascertain her identity and request information about her
activities which appear to be suspicious.
The United State Supreme Court's opinion in
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), is instructive.
There, the Court held that a peace officer may request the driver
of a vehicle, stopped for a mere traffic violation, to step out of
the vehicle with no indication of other unlawful activity
whatever.

The Court characterized the intrusion as "de minimus",
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as "at most a mere inconvenience", and as one which "hardly rises
to the level of a 'petty indignity'"

434 U.S. at 111.

The Court

held that a generalized concern for the officer's own safety,
arising from the percentage of police shootings that occurred when
an officer approached a suspect seated in a vehicle, without any
evidence of danger in the particular case, was sufficient to
justify requiring every driver stopped for a traffic violation to
get out of the car.
Some state courts have applied the Mimms analysis to
cases similar to this one.

In State v. Ferrise, 269 N.W.2d 888

(Minn. 1978), police officers stopped a car which they observed
driving the wrong way in their lane of traffic on a divided
highway shortly after they had received a radio report of a
robbery in the area.

Nothing was known by the officers that

connected this car to the robbery.

The driver stepped out of the

stopped car and met one of the officers halfway between the two
vehicles.

When the driver was unable to produce identification,

the officer walked up to the passenger side of the car to talk to
the passenger.

Unable to see inside the car, the officer opened

the car door and, upon doing so, saw a gun which he grabbed.
then removed the passenger and patted him down.

The Ferrise court

reasoned:
"If an officer orders a driver to get
out of his car, as in Mimms, what he in
effect is doing is also ordering the driver
to open the door, because that is generally
the only reasonable way a person can get out
of a car. Operationally then, there is
little practical difference between ordering
a driver to open his door and get out of his
car, on the one hand, and opening the door
for the driver and telling him to get out,
-9-

He

on the other. In this case, if the driver
had not gotten out of the car on his own,
the officer could have opened the door and
told him to get out.
While the Mimms case involved only the
right to order a driver to get out of the
car, the Mimms analysis would seem also to
justify a policy of ordering passengers out.
The same concern of the officers for their
own safety applies, and the intrusion on the
rights of the passengers occasioned by being
required to get out of the car is no greater
than the intrusion on the rights of the
driver.
[3] In this case, the officer who
opened the door and told the passenger to
get out did not testify that he did this
pursuant to any policy or out of any concern
for his own safety. The officer, however,
had a good reason for going back to the car
and talking to the passenger. Specifically,
he wanted to see if the passenger could aid
them in accurately identifying the driver so
a license check could be made. Since the
car was covered with snow and the officer
could not see the passenger, the officer
simply opened the door. While he probably
could have tapped on the window to get the
passenger's attention, we fail to see how
this action in opening the door in order to
talk with the passenger could be deemed
unreasonable, especially when under the
Mimms holding he probably could have done so
whether or not he had a particular reason
for wanting to talk to the passenger.
We hold that the intrusion into the
passenger's privacy was minimal and that it
may not prevail when balanced against the
important public interests involved. The
test is the reasonableness of the intrusion
under all the circumstances, and in this
case the minimal intrusion was completely
reasonable and proper."
269 N.W.2d at 890-91.
Similarly, Lieutenant Gray had good reason to approach
defendant and ask for identification and investigate her actions
on State Street.

As Lieutenant Gray approached he observed

defendant's activities which increased his suspicious.
-10-

In State v. Trujillo, 749 P.2d 85 (Utah Ct. App. 1987),
this Court addressed the issue of when, during the police
encounter, a seizure occurs.

In that case, Trujillo and others

were walking slowly down the street, peering into windows at 3:30
a.m.

An officer approached them and asked for identification.

No

one tried to flee and all three gave the officer their correct
names.

They explained that they were going to Trujillo's cousin's

house.

The officer frisked Trujillo and found a knife strapped to

his chest.

This Court began by determining if and when Trujillo

had been seized.

The Court said:

" A seizure within the meaning of the
fourth amendment occurs only when the
officer by means of physical force or
show of authority has in some way
restricted the liberty of a person.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553, 100 S.Ct.
at 1876 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 19,
n.16, 88 S.Ct. at 1879, n.16). When a
reasonable person, based on the totality
of the circumstances, remains, not in
the spirit of cooperation with the
officer's investigation, but because he
believes he is not free to leave a
seizure occurs. Id. at 544, 555, 100
S.Ct. at 1870, 1877."
739 P.2d at 87 (footnote omitted) this Court further quoted the
U.S. Supreme Court in Mendenhall in giving examples of
circumstances amounting to seizure including drawn guns, presence
of several officers, physical touching by police, and language or
tone of voice compelling compliance by the citizen.

739 P.2d at

87.
In the Trujillo case this Court found insufficient
information in the record to determine whether a seizure occurred
prior to the pat-down search of Trujillo so it "assumed[d] that up
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to that point no intrusion upon Trujillo's constitutionally
protected rights occurred."

739 P.2d at 88. However, the Court

did find a seizure when the officer took hold of Trujillo and
patted him down.
Even under Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1978) and
State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119 (Utah 1983), the initial stop of the
defendant in the present case was not a seizure.

Both of those

cases speak of the stopping of the automobile and the detention of
the occupant.
seizure.

The stopping of the automobile, by itself, is not a

Just as in the Trujillo case, there must be an

additional step of detaining the occupant before a seizure occurs.
Respondent agrees that defendant was eventually
detained and seized but that seizure did not occur at the initial
stop of the car and approach by Lieutenant Gray.

The seizure

occurred after Lieutenant Gray saw defendant try to hide the roll
of towels and then disclaim ownership of the towels.

By then,

Lieutenant Gray had reasonable suspicion to retrieve the towels
and unroll them based on defendant's actions.

Lieutenant Gray

also had at least reasonable suspicion at that point to detain
defendant until the suspicious actions were explained.
POINT III.
THE OFFICERS HAD ARTICULABLE FACTS ALLOWING
THEM TO STOP THE CAR AND APPROACH DEFENDANT
BEFORE HER FURTHER ACTIONS GAVE THEM CAUSE TO
DETAIN HER.
Analysis of the stop of the car must be separate from
analysis of the detention of defendant because of the different
levels of police encounter as cited in Deitman and Merritt.
officers articulated specific facts for wanting to stop the
-12-

The

vehicle containing defendant and for suspecting criminal behavior
(R.39 at 21-22),

Utah Code Ann. S 77-7-15 (1982) and State v.

Swaniqan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985), reinforce the concept that an
officer needs reasonable suspicion, not a mere hunch, to detain a
person.

The United States Supreme Court has said that an officer

may look at the facts giving rise to reasonable suspicion in light
of his experience.

In Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979), that

Court found that the officer was unable to point to any facts that
the situation was suspicious.

In a footnote the Court said:

This situation is to be distinguished from
the observations of a trained, experienced
police officer who is able to perceive and
articulate meaning in given conduct which
would be wholly innocent to the untrained
observer.
443 U.S. at 52 (footnote 2)(citation omitted).

That Court had

earlier said:
In all situations the officer is entitled to
assess the facts in light of his experience
in detecting illegal entry and smuggling.
U.S v. Briqnoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,885 (1975).
In the present case the officers were able to
articulate specific facts which caused them to be suspicious of
defendant and her companion.

Both officers had been peace

officers for many years and both worked in the Vice Squad (R. 39
at 4 and 25). Sergeant Shelton had attended additional training
in relation to vice enforcement (R. 39 at 4).

The officers knew

that the area between 800 South and 2100 South State Street, Salt
Lake City, had a high incident rate of prostitution and other
crime (R.39 at 5).

They were familiar with the normal scenario

for prostitution in the area (R.39 at 6).
•13-

The officers saw defendant walking slowly south on
State Street (R. 39 at 5 to 7) and noted that her walking pace was
consistent with prostitution.

She was strolling very slowly and

looking back toward traffic (R. 39 at 21). She spoke to drivers
in three different cars and then got in the second car when it
approached her the second time (R. 39 at 8). This carf with
defendant in it, went south another four blocks then turned into
the South High School parking lot even though there was no
activity there that evening (R. 39 at 9-10).

When the officers

turned back to South High the car left the parking lot after
having been in the lot for only seconds (R.39 at 9). As the
officers watched, the car turned into the second parking lot and
again stayed only seconds before entering the street again (R.39
at 10). Based on the defendant's activity when walking on the
street and then the apparently evasive driving of the car, the
officers had developed articulable suspicion of criminal activity
and an attempt to avoid officers that validated their stop of the
vehicle.
The cases cited by defendant in asking this Court to
reverse defendant's conviction are distinguishable from the
present case.

In State v. Trulillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah Ct. App.

1987), this Court said that in the totality of the circumstances
the seizure of Trujillo was not supported by reasonable suspicion.
The stop in Trujillo was based on the late hour and the high crime
factor.

This Court found that the officer had not articulated any

activity by Trujillo that was suspicious enough to warrant the
officer actually seizing and patting down Trujillo.
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In the present case, the officers did articulate
factors beyond the high-prostitution-area factor.
walking slowly and looking back toward traffic.

Defendant was

She stopped to

speak to three different vehicles four different times in
approximately a two-block area.

The second car returned and

picked her up then appeared to take evasive action when the
officers followed them.

That gave articulable suspicion for the

initial stop of the car defendant was in.
The actual seizure or detaining of defendant occurred
after the additional suspicious activity by defendant of trying to
hide a roll of towels taken out of her purse (R.39 at 30). She
tried to stuff the towels between the seat and the console then
disclaimed ownership (R.39 at 30). Those additional factors
increased the reasonable suspicion on the officer's part to detain
defendant and check the towels.
In State v. Carpena# 714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986), the only
factors the officer used to stop and detain Carpena were the late
hourf slow moving car, out of state license plates, and past
burglaries in the area.

The Utah Supreme Court found those to be

insufficient in that case.

The officers in the present case had

observed additional suspicious activities on the part of defendant
which were not consistent with an innocent walk or drive on State
Street.

The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Whittenback# 621 P.2d

103 (Utah 1980), affirmed that defendant's conviction when the
Court found reasonable suspicion in the totality of the
circumstances for the stop.

The previous contact between

Whittenback and the officer was only one factor to look at in
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making that determination.

The fact that previous contact between

defendant and the officers in the present case is not in the
record does not diminish the strength of the other circumstances
pointing to articulable suspicion of criminal activity.
Cases

in which a "courier profile" was used to stop

vehicles and search cars do not apply to the present case.
Defendant was not stopped solely because of where she was or how
she was dressed or how she wore her hair or her ethnic appearance.
Most of those factors were not even mentioned in the evidence.
The car in which she was riding was stopped because of defendant's
activities on State Street and the car's evasive actions.
Defendant was further detained because of her concealment
activities as Lieutenant Gray approached her side of the car.
The totality of the evidence presented in the record
establishes that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop the
car and to further detain defendant when she tried to hide the
towels taken from her purse.
POINT IV.
THE INSPECTION OF THE ROLL OF TOWELS AND ITS
SUBSEQUENT SEIZURE WERE PROPER
Defendant maintains that the retrieving and unrolling
of the paper towels was unlawful.

The recent line of Utah cases

dealing with "plain view" seizures validates the inspection and
subsequent seizure of the towels in this case.

The Court in State

v. Gallegos, 712 P.2d 207 (Utah 1985), quoted State v. Romero, 660
P.2d 715 (Utah 1983) as it held:
"Thus, a warrantless seizure or
property in plain view after a lawful
intrusion is justified if: "(1) the
-16-

officer is lawfully present where the
search and seizure occur; (2) the
evidence is in plain view; and (3) the
evidence is clearly incriminating.M
712 P.2d at 210 (footnote omitted).

In that case, officers were

lawfully present and the VCR was in plain view but nothing about
the VCR made it clearly incriminating.

There were no attempts by

defendant to hide it.
In State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385 (Utah 1986), the Utah
Supreme court cited Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983)(plurality
opinion), and said:
The opinion expresses concern, however,
with the implication of the requirement
that the incriminating nature of the item
to be seized be "immediately apparent."
"[T]he use of the phrase 'immediately
apparent' was very likely a very unhappy
choice of words, since it can be taken to
imply that an unduly high degree of
certainty as to the incriminatory
character of evidence is necessary for an
application of the 'plain view
doctrine.'" Ld. at 741, 103 S. Ct. at
1542. The Court therefore reaffirmed the
rule that all that is required is that
there be "'probable cause to associate
the property with criminal activity.'"
Id. at 741-42,103 S.Ct. at 1543 (quoting
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587,
100 S.Ct. 1371, 1380, 63 L.Ed.2d 639
(1980)). Under that standard, an officer
must only have a reasonable belief "that
certain items may be contraband or stolen
property or useful as evidence of a
crime; it does not demand any showing
that such a belief be correct..." A
'practical, nontechnical' probability
that incriminating evidence is involved
is all that is required." Brown, 460
U.S. at 742, 103 S.Ct. at 1543 (quoting
Brineqar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1311, 93 L.Ed. 1879
(1949))."
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718 P.2d at 390.

The Utah Supreme Court quotes the "probable

cause" language of Texas v. Brown but then says that the officer
"must only have reasonable belief" that the item is contraband.
Id.

This left confusion as to the standard in Utah as to whether

reasonable suspicion or probable cause is necessary in
determining the incriminating nature of the item in plain view.
Respondent maintains that the officers' actions in the
present case were justified under either standard*

The officer

was outside of the car where he had a lawful right to be; he saw
the roll of towels in plain view as defendant took them out of her
purse;

defendant's actions in trying to hide the towels gave the

officer probable cause to associate them with criminal activity.
Lieutenant Gray testified that defendant's purse was initially on
her lap as he approached the car, then she put it down on the
floor.

She then took the roll of towels out of her purse and

tried to stuff them between the car seat and the console.

The

officer opened the door and asked for the roll and defendant said
that they were not hers (R.39 at 30). If one could believe
defendant's statement at that point one could argue that defendant
does not have standing to challenge the seizure of the towels.
When defendant disclaimed ownership of the towels,
officer seized them and unrolled them and found syringes with
cocaine in them (R.39 at 31). Defendant's attempt to hide the
towels and to disclaim ownership when she had removed them from
her purse gave the officer reason to believe that the towels were
evidence of criminal evidence.

Had the towels just been sitting

there and no attempt made to hide them, they would not have been
clearly incriminating.
-18-

The picking up and unwrapping of the towels was a
minimal intrusion.

Courts in other jurisdictions have addressed

the issue of picking up an object in plain view to examine it.
While it is impossible to reconcile all of the
decisions on this point, many of which do not
articulate a clear rationale, most of the cases can be
explained as follows: The minimal additional intrusion
which results from an inspection or examination of an
object in plain view is reasonable if the officer was
first aware of some facts and circumstances which
justify a reasonable suspicion (not probable cause, in
the traditional sense) that the object is or contains a
fruit, instrumentality, or evidence of crime.
2 W. La Fave, Search and Seizure; A Treatise on the Fourth
Amendment, § 6.7(b), 717 (2d ed. 1987).
Respondent urges this Court to rule that the officer
needed only reasonable suspicion to pick up and unwrap the towels.
The officer had reasonable suspicion at the very least when he saw
defendant take the towels out of her purse, try to hide them and
then disclaim ownership.

Once the towels were unwrapped and the

syringes exposed, the officer had probable cause to seize the
towels and syringes and to arrest defendant.
Respondent suggests that there were different levels of
police encounter with defendant in this case which should be
analyzed under different standards.

The initial stop of the car

was analogous to an officer walking up to someone on the street
and asking for identification.

The officers here were able to

articulate reasons for wanting to approach defendant but
respondent maintains that the initial stop did not require the
same level of suspicion that a detention of defendant requires.
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After this initial stop, Lieutenant Gray saw further
activity by defendant which raised the level of suspicion and
justified the actions of Lieutenant Gray in picking up and
unrolling the towels.

By that time, the towels, which were in

plain view, had become clearly incriminating when defendant tried
to hide them and disclaim ownership.
Finally, Lieutenant Gray had probable cause to seize
the towels when he unrolled them and found the syringes.

At that

point the towels were clearly evidence of an attempt to hide the
syringes which contained contraband.
POINT V
THE TEST FOR DETERMINING REASONABLE SUSPICION
IS AN APPROPRIATE TEST OF THE LAWFULNESS OF
THIS STOP UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AS WELL
AS THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
Defendant asks this Court to fashion some new, more
rigorous standard for determining the meaning of reasonable
suspicion in this case but does not give the court any assistance
as to what this new standard should be.

By its nature the

statutory reasonable suspicion standard requires a case-by-case
analysis of the facts.

The Court must find in the evidence before

it "specific, articulable facts which, together with rational
inferences drawn from those facts, would lead a reasonable person
to conclude [defendant] had committed or was about to commit a
crime."

Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 88. The very nature of this

analysis defies a "bright-line" standard.

Defendant has not given

this Court a suggested test for determining reasonable suspicion
beyond the present one because there is none.

The courts must

make that determination based on a review of the facts in each
case.
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Defendant's argument for a different standard under the
Utah Constitution is based on dicta in recent Utah Supreme court
cases.

See State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986) and State v.

Hyqh, 711 P.2d 264, 271-73 (Uah 1985) (Zimerman, J., concurring).
In a recent case the Utah Supreme court declined to draw a
distinction between the provisions against unreasonable search and
seizure found in the United States and the Utah constitutions.

In

State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988), the Court said:
"Article I, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution reads nearly verbatim
with the fourth amendment, and thus
this court has never drawn any
distinctions between the protections
afforded by the respective
consitutional provisions. Rather, the
court has always considered the
protections afforded to be one and the
same. We do not depart from the view
in this case, and hold that
unreasonable private searches are not
subject to the protection of article
I, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution.H
750 P.2d at 1221 (footnotes omitted).
Respondent maintains that there is no reason in the
present case for this Court to formulate a different test under
the Utah Constitution.

The "totality of the circumstances" test

for determining reasonable suspicion has been used consistently by
the Utah courts as well as Federal courts and is the appropriate
test for this case.

See also

State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah

Court Appeals 1988), wherein this Court applied the "totality of
the circumstances" test.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing the State requests this Court to
affirm the trial court's conviction of defendant.
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